

A Joint Network/Control Design for Cooperative Automatic Driving

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Abstract—Cooperative automatic driving, or platooning, is a promising solution to improve traffic safety, while reducing congestion and pollution. The design of a control system for this application is a challenging, multi-disciplinary problem, as cooperation between vehicles is obtained through wireless communication. So far, control and network issues of platooning have been investigated separately. In this work we design a cooperative driving system from a joint network and control perspective, determining worst-case upper bounds on the safety distance subject to network losses, so the actual inter-vehicle gap can be tuned depending on vehicle or network performance. By means of simulation, we show that the system is very robust to packet losses and that the derived bounds are never violated.

I. INTRODUCTION

Traffic congestion and safety are still two major problems of modern transportation on roads. One promising solution to such problems is cooperative driving. By means of wireless communication, vehicles share information about their status and the sensed surrounding environment, which drastically increases the perception of what happens around them, enabling cooperation. Using only standard in-car sensors, as currently done by prototype self-driving vehicles, does not empower this ability, thus in many ways self-driving vehicles share the same limitations of human drivers. As an example, a wireless link can let a vehicle know the *future* intended trajectory of another one (at an intersection, as a long term destination or cruising speed, etc), a feat that no on-board sensor can do.

To reduce highway congestion, the community has proposed an application called Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC), a communication-enhanced version of a standard Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) that is capable of maintaining a very small inter-vehicle spacing while ensuring passengers' safety. The CACC forms trains of vehicles, called *platoons*, so this application is also known with the name of *cooperative automatic driving*, or *platooning*. Platooning provides benefits in terms of efficiency, safety, and driving comfort [1], [2]. Lowering the inter-vehicle gap results in a better use of the road infrastructure (where most of the space is now simply wasted due to safety distances), improves traffic flow and thus reduces congestion and, at the same time, the waste of fuel due to start and stop dynamics caused by congestion itself. Safety is improved because an automated system takes control over human driving, which, as shown by statistics, is the cause of more than 90% of the accidents [3]. Finally, comfort is

improved as there is no longer the need to focus on driving, so the “former driver” is free to do other activities.

The design of a cooperative driving system is a control-theoretical problem that is inevitably intertwined with networking problems. The input to the control algorithm is information about the other vehicles in the platoon, such as speed, position, or acceleration, which is conveyed via wireless links, through periodic broadcast (or beaconing), as well as via local sensors that can improve the precision of distance and relative speed measures. Given the inherent nature of a wireless link, data packets can be lost, which in turn has a dramatic impact on the performance of the application. Bad performance of autonomous driving can result in injuries or loss of life.

Most of the works in the field do not consider, or consider only partially, the impact of wireless impairments on the performance of the control system. In this paper we design a cooperative driving algorithm that specifically takes into account error dynamics due to loss of data and ensures that a predefined safety bound is never violated, given a particular worst-case scenario. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to jointly design a control algorithm and a dedicated communication protocol that takes into account packet losses. The main features of our proposal can be summarized as follows:

- The design jointly considers control and network performance. The controller parameters can be tuned to obey some predefined bounds on the position error, given an upper bound on the input error caused by network impairments (Sections III and IV). By means of simulations, we show that the controller never violates the imposed safety constraints (Section V);
- The algorithm is capable to maintain a constant spacing policy thanks to a leader plus bidirectional control topology, which comes with no additional network overhead with respect to a commonly assumed leader- plus predecessor-following scheme (see Sections II and V);
- The vehicles in the platoon share a common target speed, which can be changed by an external authority, e.g., an optimal speed advisory infrastructure.

II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK

The design of a cooperative automatic driving (or platooning) system is definitely a challenging task, as is witnessed by the

large body literature on the topic. Different solutions have been proposed, with different design assumptions and thus characteristics. The main goal is to keep the inter-vehicle gap as small as possible, while ensuring passengers' safety. The key difference to standard ACC solutions is the use of wireless communication for sharing control data with potentially all the vehicles in the platoon. Wireless communication allows a vehicle to "see" behind other vehicles, which is not possible by using standard radar sensors. In addition, by means of communication, a vehicle can inform the others about what it is going to do, letting them "know the future".

A key design choice is the *logical control topology*, indicating from which members each vehicle is considering data to compute the control action. This is different from the actual network topology, which is typically broadcast-like. Even if the network topology is a full mesh, the control algorithm may simply exploit a subset of the received information. As an example, the controllers in [4]–[6] implement a predecessor-following topology, where each vehicle is using the information of its predecessor only. Other examples include a leader- and predecessor-following topology [7], [8], which considers in addition the information of the first vehicle. We also find bidirectional [9] and potentially all-to-all [10] control topologies.

The choice of the control topology has implications on the system performance, in particular with respect to the gap policy. Predecessor-following control topologies are proven to be string-stable only under a constant time headway gap policy [4], [7]. This means that the distance is constant in time, so the faster the vehicles, the larger the gap. If this policy is not respected, then the string-stability property is violated, so distance errors at the head of the platoon might be propagated and amplified towards the end, potentially leading to collisions. By adding a link to the leader, instead, the system can be string-stabilized with respect to a constant spacing gap, i.e., the distance is fixed and it is not related to cruising speed [7].

String-stability, however, is not generally related to the distance (or the time headway) vehicles should maintain to avoid collisions in case of packet losses. The performance of a cooperative automatic driving system is typically analyzed with a pure control-theoretic approach, so that a quantitative characterization of the safety gap as a function of the network conditions is hard to find in the literature [11].

To address this issue, the present work proposes the joint network and control design of a cooperative automatic driving system. A theoretic bound on the minimum inter-vehicle distance subject to packet losses is derived in a worst-case scenario. If the conditions considered for the worst-case analysis never occur, then the inter-vehicle distance can never be smaller than the computed bound. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to realize such kind of control system.

III. CONTROL ALGORITHM

The goal of our control model is to empower good cooperative driving performance and, at the same time, provide an analytic framework for the design of the communication

Table I: Main notation used in the paper.

$y_i, \dot{y}_i, \ddot{y}_i$	position, speed, and acceleration of vehicle i
$v(t)$	reference speed
d	desired distance between vehicles
k	elastic coefficient
h	inter-vehicle friction coefficient
r	vehicle-reference friction coefficient
δ_i	communication-induced disturbance term
N_L	maximum number of consecutive packets lost
T	Beacon interval

system in terms of information loss. We propose a class of distributed controllers (which can be seen either as spring-damper mechanical systems, or as impedance-matched electromagnetic systems [12]) that ensure string stability as proven by Eq. (24) in Section III-C.

The control action depends on information about the vehicle in front and the one behind (bidirectional topology), and all vehicles are "glued" together by a common dynamic reference speed $v(t)$. $v(t)$ can be imposed by the first vehicle of the platoon, thus having a control topology similar to [7], or can be decided by any other vehicle or taken from an external source (e.g. speed indications coming from the infrastructure). Even the leader follows the reference speed with a transient. Table I reports the main notation used throughout the paper.

We consider the following dynamic model: For vehicle 1 (the leader),

$$\ddot{y}_1 = -k(y_1 - y_2 - d) - h(\dot{y}_1 - \dot{y}_2) - r(\dot{y}_1 - v) + \delta_1, \quad (1)$$

for vehicles $i = 2, \dots, N - 1$,

$$\begin{aligned} \ddot{y}_i = & -k(y_i - y_{i+1} - d) - k(y_i - y_{i-1} + d) \\ & - h(\dot{y}_i - \dot{y}_{i+1}) - h(\dot{y}_i - \dot{y}_{i-1}) - r(\dot{y}_i - v) + \delta_i \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

and, for vehicle N ,

$$\ddot{y}_N = -k(y_N - y_{N-1} + d) - h(\dot{y}_N - \dot{y}_{N-1}) - r(\dot{y}_N - v) + \delta_N, \quad (3)$$

where, besides the control algorithm coefficients h , k , and r , δ_i is a disturbance factor essentially due to packet losses (the dominant source of disturbance, as discussed in Section IV).

A. Analysis

Consider the model in Eqs. (1) to (3) with $d = 0$. This is equivalent to changing the variables as $\hat{y}_i = y_i + d(1 - i)$, $i = 1, \dots, N$, so that the condition $\hat{y}_1 = \hat{y}_2 = \dots = \hat{y}_N$ is achieved when the true distance between consecutive vehicles is d as desired; we drop the hat to keep the notation simpler.

Let $\bar{\mathbf{1}}$ be the all-one vector $\bar{\mathbf{1}}^\top = [1 \ 1 \ \dots \ 1]$ and define the average position as

$$a(t) = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^N y_i}{N} = \frac{\bar{\mathbf{1}}^\top \mathbf{y}}{N}. \quad (4)$$

Then we introduce a new vector $z(t)$ whose components are the differences $z_i = y_{i-1} - y_i$, $i = 2, \dots, N$:

$$\begin{bmatrix} z_2(t) \\ z_3(t) \\ \vdots \\ z_N(t) \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & -1 & 0 & \dots & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & -1 & \dots & 0 & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & \dots & 1 & -1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} y_1(t) \\ y_2(t) \\ y_3(t) \\ \vdots \\ y_N(t) \end{bmatrix}, \quad (5)$$

which can be synthetically written as

$$z(t) = Dy(t), \quad (6)$$

where D is the $(N-1) \times N$ matrix appearing in Eq. (5). Note that the vector $[a(t) \ z^\top(t)]^\top$, including the average and the differences, is in one-to-one correspondence with $y(t)$.

With a few algebraic manipulations, the overall system can be written in matrix form as

$$\ddot{y} = -kLy - hL\dot{y} - r\dot{y} + r\bar{\mathbf{I}}v(t) + \Delta, \quad (7)$$

where $L \doteq D^\top D \in \mathbb{R}^{N \times N}$ and $\Delta = [\delta_1 \dots \delta_N]^\top$. The dynamics of the average position a ,

$$\ddot{a}(t) = -r\dot{a}(t) + rv(t) + \frac{1}{N}\bar{\mathbf{I}}^\top \Delta, \quad (8)$$

does not depend on k and h , while it does depend on the average components $\Delta_{av} \doteq \frac{1}{N}\bar{\mathbf{I}}^\top \Delta$ of the disturbance.

Conversely, the dynamics of the differences $z = Dy$,

$$\ddot{z} = -kMz - hM\dot{z} - rz + D\Delta, \quad (9)$$

where $M \doteq DD^\top \in \mathbb{R}^{(N-1) \times (N-1)}$, does not depend on the reference speed $v(t)$, which can thus be changed as needed, without changing the dynamics of the system or hampering its safety. Then the system can be analyzed by separately studying the evolution of Eq. (8) and of Eq. (9). Section III-B investigates the average properties of the platoon, while Section III-C explores the performance in terms of the differential dynamics between vehicles.

B. The average dynamics

The transient from zero speed to the desired speed $v(t)$ can be studied by considering the system in Eq. (8) with initial conditions $a(0) = \dot{a}(0) = 0$, meaning that the platoon is at rest in an initial position (assumed to be position 0). Its solution yields the average position

$$a(t) = vt - \frac{v}{r} + \frac{v}{r}e^{-rt}, \quad (10)$$

with average speed $\dot{a}(t) = v - ve^{-rt}$ and average acceleration $\ddot{a}(t) = rve^{-rt}$. The acceleration is maximal at the beginning and equal to rv . The time constant

$$\tau_a = \frac{1}{r} \quad (11)$$

can be controlled by choosing r based on the trade-off between promptness and comfort.

C. The difference dynamics

A smooth average behavior of a platoon is important, but the dynamics of the differences z_i is fundamental for safety and group behavior: $z_i = d$ means that two vehicles are at the double of the desired distance d , while $z_i = -d$ means collision. The key design specification is therefore

$$|z_i| \leq \alpha d, \quad (12)$$

where $0 < \alpha < 1$ is a safety coefficient.

In wireless vehicular control, disturbances are essentially originated by packet losses. If a packet is not received by a vehicle, then there is a lack of information on the positions of the preceding and/or following vehicles. The typical (indeed probably the only reasonable one, given the small beaconing time) assumption in this case is that the vehicles are at the same distance with the same speed as the last transmitted information. The discrepancy between the actual relative position and speed and the estimated ones introduces a disturbance. Denoting by \underline{y}_i the stale old information Eq. (2), yields

$$\begin{aligned} \ddot{y}_i = & -k(y_i - \underline{y}_{i+1} - d) - k(y_i - \underline{y}_{i-1} + d) \\ & - h(\dot{y}_i - \dot{\underline{y}}_{i+1}) - h(\dot{y}_i - \dot{\underline{y}}_{i-1}) - r(\dot{y}_i - \underline{v}). \end{aligned} \quad (13)$$

We can rewrite the dynamics as

$$\begin{aligned} \ddot{y}_i = & -k(y_i - y_{i+1} - d) - k(y_i - y_{i-1} + d) \\ & - h(\dot{y}_i - \dot{y}_{i+1}) - h(\dot{y}_i - \dot{y}_{i-1}) - r(\dot{y}_i - v) + \delta_i, \end{aligned} \quad (14)$$

where

$$\delta_i = h \frac{d}{dt} \delta y_{i+1} + h \frac{d}{dt} \delta y_{i-1} + k \delta y_{i+1} + k \delta y_{i-1} + r \delta v. \quad (15)$$

Equation (15) gives a clear criterion to co-design the constants h and k and the communication system to keep the error within safe boundaries. Once a packet loss has occurred we can investigate how the system recovers after the occurrence and how the system behaves if the packet losses occur repeatedly in a burst leading to a potentially larger difference between the true information and the last received one.

Let us introduce the new variable

$$x = P^\top z, \quad (16)$$

to diagonalize the system, so that it is easier to study its stability, where P is the orthonormal matrix such that $M = P\Omega^2 P^\top$ and the diagonal entries of $\Omega^2 = \text{diag}\{\Omega_1^2, \dots, \Omega_{N-1}^2\}$ are the eigenvalues of M (i.e., the nonzero eigenvalues of L). Then, Eq. (9) can be rewritten as

$$\ddot{x} = -k\Omega^2 x - h\Omega^2 \dot{x} - r\dot{x} + \hat{\delta}, \quad (17)$$

with $\hat{\delta} = P^\top D\Delta$. Note that, being P orthonormal, it does not change the Euclidean norm: $\|x\| = \|P^\top z\| = \|z\|$.

If we apply the Laplace transform, with zero initial conditions, we have

$$X(s) = [s^2 I + (h\Omega^2 + rI)s + k\Omega^2]^{-1} \hat{\Delta}(s) = \Gamma(s) \hat{\Delta}(s), \quad (18)$$

where $\Gamma(s)$ is a diagonal matrix of transfer functions

$$\Gamma(s) = \text{diag} \left\{ \frac{1}{s^2 + (h\Omega_i^2 + r)s + k\Omega_i^2} \right\}. \quad (19)$$

The denominators of the transfer functions $\Gamma_i(s)$ are second order polynomials with positive coefficients, hence stability is ensured because their roots (the poles of the transfer functions) have a negative real part. We can also state the following result, proven in the extended version of the paper [13].

Proposition 1: The poles of the transfer functions $\Gamma_i(s)$ are real and negative if

$$h > \frac{k}{r}. \quad (20)$$

We assume that Eq. (20) holds, hence all poles are real and negative, and we consider two problems:

- 1) The reaction of the platoon to an erroneous position of one of more vehicles (with no disturbances);
- 2) The reaction of the platoon to disturbances that are bounded in norm as $\|\hat{\delta}\| \leq \rho$.

For the first problem, we assume that $D\Delta = 0$ and that at some time ($t = 0$ without loss of generality) there is a mismatch in the position: $z(0) = z_0$, with zero speed. Then, we consider the Laplace transform: Since $\mathcal{L}[z(t)] = Z(s)$, $\mathcal{L}[\dot{z}(t)] = sZ(s) - z_0$ and $\mathcal{L}[\ddot{z}(t)] = s^2Z(s) - sz_0$, from Eq. (9) we get

$$[s^2I + (hM + rI)s + kM]Z(s) = [sI + (hM + rI)]z_0. \quad (21)$$

Since $X(s) = P^\top Z(s)$ and $x_0 = P^\top z_0$,

$$\begin{aligned} X(s) &= [s^2I + (h\Omega^2 + rI)s + k\Omega^2]^{-1} [sI + (h\Omega^2 + rI)]x_0 \\ &\doteq \Phi(s)x_0 = \text{diag} \left\{ \frac{s + (h\Omega_i^2 + r)}{s^2 + (h\Omega_i^2 + r)s + k\Omega_i^2} \right\} x_0. \end{aligned} \quad (22)$$

Then, the components of x evolve independently. Let us consider the inverse transform $\phi(t) = \text{diag}\{\phi_i(t)\} = \mathcal{L}^{-1}[\Phi(s)]$. We have that $\phi_i(0) = 1$, from the initial value theorem ($\lim_{t \rightarrow 0} \phi_i(t) = \lim_{s \rightarrow \infty} s\Phi_i(s)$). Hence $\phi(0) = I$. Moreover, all $\phi_i(t)$ are strictly decreasing, as can be shown by considering their derivative:

$$\mathcal{L}[\dot{\phi}_i(t)] = s\Phi_i(s) - \phi_i(0) = \frac{-k\Omega_i^2}{s^2 + (h\Omega_i^2 + r)s + k\Omega_i^2}. \quad (23)$$

This transfer function has real poles only, no zeros, and a negative coefficient at the numerator, hence its inverse Laplace transform $\dot{\phi}_i(t)$ is negative [14], [15]. Hence, all $\phi_i(t)$'s are equal to 1 at $t = 0$ and converge to 0 for $t \rightarrow \infty$ (because the poles of the transfer function are real and negative). Therefore, they must be always positive and bounded as $\|\phi(t)\| \leq 1$ for all t . Hence, $|x_i(t)| < |x_{0,i}|$ for $t > 0$. Coming back to z , the inverse transform of $Z(s)$ is $z(t) = P\phi(t)P^\top z_0$. Hence, for a perturbation of size $\|z_0\|$,

$$\|z(t)\| = \|P\phi(t)P^\top z_0\| = \|\phi(t)\| \|z_0\| < \|z_0\|, \quad \text{for } t > 0. \quad (24)$$

The previous inequality ensures string stability. Assume there is a misplacement (error) measured by $|z_i(0)| = \zeta$, then $\|z_0\| = \zeta$,

this implies that $\|z(t)\| < \zeta$. Since the norm is greater or equal than the magnitude of any component, then $|z_j(t)| \leq \zeta$: No component will exceed the initial size ζ . More formally:

Proposition 2: If $z_i(0) = \zeta \neq 0$ and $z_j(0) = 0$ for $j \neq i$, then $|z_j(t)| \leq \zeta$ for $t > 0$.

To determine the effect of a nonzero disturbance Δ , we can consider Eqs. (9) and (17) indifferently, since the transformation P^\top is norm-preserving. Consider Eq. (17) with $\|\hat{\delta}(t)\| \leq \rho$. Then, the transfer function is $\Gamma(s)$: $X(s) = \Gamma(s)\hat{\Delta}(s)$.

If we assume zero initial conditions and consider the inverse Laplace transform $\gamma(t) = \mathcal{L}^{-1}[\Gamma(s)]$, the solution is given by the convolution $x(t) = \int_0^t \gamma(\sigma) \hat{\delta}(t - \sigma) d\sigma$. Then

$$\begin{aligned} \|x(t)\| &\leq \int_0^t \|\gamma(\sigma)\| \|\hat{\delta}(t - \sigma)\| d\sigma \leq \rho \int_0^t \|\gamma(\sigma)\| d\sigma \\ &\leq \rho \int_0^\infty \|\gamma(\sigma)\| d\sigma = \rho \max_k \int_0^\infty |\gamma_k(\sigma)| d\sigma = \rho \max_k \int_0^\infty \gamma_k(\sigma) d\sigma. \end{aligned}$$

We removed the absolute value because $\gamma_k(\sigma)$ is a positive function. In fact, it has real poles only, no zeros and a positive coefficient at the numerator [14], [15]. The value of the integral can be computed by means of the final value theorem:

$$\int_0^\infty \gamma_k(\sigma) d\sigma = \frac{1}{s^2 + (h\Omega_i^2 + rI)s + k\Omega_i^2} \Big|_{s=0} = \frac{1}{k\Omega_i^2}.$$

This results in the bound

$$\|x(t)\| \leq \rho \frac{1}{k\Omega_1^2}, \quad (25)$$

where Ω_1^2 is the smallest eigenvalue of M (i.e., the smallest nonzero eigenvalue of L). Recall that $\|x(t)\| = \|z(t)\|$.

As a final consideration, the error given by Eq. (15) scales with k , h and r , if we assume that v is fixed and exactly known. On the other hand, Eq. (20) is assumed to hold, hence $hr > k$. If we take $h/k = (1 + \epsilon)/r$, with $\epsilon > 0$, the overall error scales linearly with k , because we can write

$$\begin{aligned} \|\delta_i\| &= k \left\| \frac{1 + \epsilon}{r} \frac{d}{dt} \delta y_{i+1} + \frac{1 + \epsilon}{r} \frac{d}{dt} \delta y_{i-1} + \delta y_{i+1} + \delta y_{i-1} \right\| \\ &\leq k \delta_{M_i}, \end{aligned} \quad (26)$$

hence, since $\|\hat{\delta}\| = \|P^\top D\Delta\|$ and $\|D\| \leq 2$,

$$\|\hat{\delta}(t)\| \leq 2k\delta_M \doteq \rho, \quad (27)$$

where δ_M is a bound for the cumulative error of position and speed (according to some norm). Then, we get the bound

$$\|x(t)\| \leq \frac{2\delta_M}{\Omega_1^2}, \quad (28)$$

which depends uniquely on the eigenvalue Ω_1^2 .

IV. MAPPING PACKET LOSSES TO ERROR BOUNDS

In cooperative driving the loss of packets is by far the major source of disturbance: Delays are negligible with direct communications, and sensor errors are limited. The loss of consecutive packets instead means that the controller is "blinded" for hundreds of milliseconds. Let N_L be the maximum number of consecutive losses (burst) than can occur in the

channel with a certain probability bound. Above this value the network is faulty, and the system should enter a disaster recovery phase, which is out of the scope of this paper.

For the worst-case analysis we want to compute the bound imposed by the loss of N_L consecutive packets on the disturbance term δ_i . We consider the error in Eq. (15). The error is expressed as the sum of the position, speed, and reference speed errors multiplied by their coefficients. With respect to the position and the speed error, the upper bound can be computed by considering the maximum jerk \bar{j} (the derivative of acceleration) a vehicle can implement. We compute the bounds on position and speed error as

$$\bar{\delta}y = \int_0^{(N_L+1)T} \int_0^t \bar{j} dt dt = \frac{\bar{j}}{2} ((N_L+1)T)^2 \quad (29)$$

$$\bar{\delta}v = \int_0^{(N_L+1)T} \int_0^t \int_0^t \bar{j} dt dt dt = \frac{\bar{j}}{6} ((N_L+1)T)^3, \quad (30)$$

where T is the packet transmission interval. With respect to the reference speed error, the bound depends on how much the reference can change. In cruising conditions sharp changes of the reference are not needed and we set a maximum allowed change in reference speed named \bar{v} between consecutive packets. By combining Eqs. (15), (29) and (30) we obtain the error bound

$$\delta_M = 2 \left(h \frac{\bar{j}}{2} ((N_L+1)T)^2 + k \frac{\bar{j}}{6} ((N_L+1)T)^3 \right) + r \bar{v} \cdot (N_L+1). \quad (31)$$

It is necessary to double the position and speed error bounds to consider both preceding and following vehicles. Finally, to compute the maximum possible error, we consider the smallest non-zero eigenvalue Ω_1^2 of $L = D^T D$, computed using the singular value decomposition of matrix D and exploiting the fact that $\|z\| \leq \frac{2\delta_M}{\Omega_1^2}$, in view of Eq. (28) and of the fact that $\|x\| = \|z\|$. Note that the value Ω_1^2 depends on the number of vehicles: The larger the number of vehicles, the smaller Ω_1^2 . Finally, we set the inter-vehicle distance to

$$d > \frac{2\delta_M}{\Omega_1^2} c_s, \quad (32)$$

where $c_s \geq 1$ is a safety coefficient.

Figure 1 plots the bound $\|z\|_{max} = \frac{2\delta_M}{\Omega_1^2}$ and, thus, the minimum safety distance d as a function of the platoon size N , for different maximum jerks \bar{j} and number of consecutive losses N_L . The remaining parameters are fixed: $T = 100$ ms, $\bar{v} = 1$ km/h per packet¹, $k = 0.5$, $h = 0.71$, $r = 1$. The platoon size N has the largest impact, as the bound grows more than linearly with N . The parameters N_L and \bar{j} also play a significant role, but the impact is not as large. In good network conditions the control system is definitely performing well, as the worst-case upper bound is below 3 m even with 8 vehicles. In non-ideal network conditions, instead, there is an important trade-off in the choice of the parameters. To

¹ This corresponds to 10 km/h per second with the given T , which is much more than the normal speed change we expect while cruising.




Figure 1: Error bound $\|z\|_{max}$ as function of the platoon size N , for different maximum jerks \bar{j} and burst size N_L .

have small inter-vehicle distances, we either need to ensure a high network reliability (thus, a low N_L) or limit the size of the platoon. Indeed, this allows us to easily regulate d and dynamically adapt it to the network conditions. Otherwise, the performance of the vehicle can also be considered and, if needed, altered for system tuning. For example, by limiting the maximum jerk to 4 m/s^3 the system can maintain a relatively small distance while being robust to heavy packet losses. It is important to remember that the bound $\|z\|_{max}$ is computed as a worst-case which, in reality, might never occur. In the next section we show that the norm of the distance errors in realistic conditions is much smaller than the bound $\|z\|_{max}$.

V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

We implement the proposed control system in the platooning simulator PLEXE [16], which allows us to test the performance of platooning control algorithms under realistic vehicle dynamics and communication models. It is especially valuable for assessing implementation-related issues as, e.g., the effect of asynchronous control data. As the data exchange rate (10 Hz) between vehicles is slower than the actuation control loop (100 Hz [4]) and vehicles might not be synchronized, the data provided to the algorithm might be incoherent from a time perspective. As an example, the own GPS position might be up to date, while the position of the front and back vehicles is “frozen” to the value included within the last received beacon.

To cope with this issue the control system includes a predictor, which computes missing values by interpolation. More formally, assume that \ddot{y}_{t_0} , \dot{y}_{t_0} , and y_{t_0} are the acceleration,

speed, and position of a vehicle at time t_0 . To estimate speed and position of such vehicle at the current time t , the control system computes

$$\dot{y}_t = \dot{y}_{t_0} + \ddot{y}_{t_0} (t - t_0), \quad y_t = y_{t_0} + \frac{t - t_0}{2} (\dot{y}_t + \dot{y}_{t_0}). \quad (33)$$

The use of Eq. (33) makes PLEXE simulation extremely realistic as this is what on-board controllers are expected to do.

A. Error Dynamics Comparison

We first show the dynamics of the vehicles without network impairments. The goal is to understand the behavior of the controller, which is qualitatively different from the solutions proposed in the literature. We compare our algorithm with the controller designed in [4], which is a well-known CACC using a time headway spacing policy.

Figure 2 shows the distance error dynamics between vehicles V_i and V_{i-1} for a platoon of 8 cars under a sinusoidal disturbance. For the CACC designed by Ploeg et. al., the leader changes its speed following the sinusoidal pattern, while for our controller we change the reference speed v . Figure 2a shows the classical attenuation of the error dynamics towards the tail of the platoon, thanks to the string-stability property. Our approach (Fig. 2b) is string stable as well, but the maximum attenuation occurs at the middle of the platoon and the dynamics are symmetric with respect to the center.

We can make an analogy between our algorithm and a spring-damper system (Fig. 3). We can imagine that consecutive vehicles are connected through a spring-damper, and an additional damper representing the reference speed v . When changing the reference speed the vehicles are pushed back/pulled forward all at the same time, and the “inner” springs take care of attenuating the internal errors. A non trivial consequence of this controller structure is that position errors are compensated balancing the control effort between the front and rear vehicle, while in most other controllers the effort is all on the rear vehicle. This is in line with the “philosophy” of an autonomous driving platoon and not of a human-driven vehicle followed by partially automated vehicles. Further discussion on this topic is beyond the scope of this paper.

B. Error Bound Analysis.

As a second analysis we perform a set of simulations to empirically show that the error bound computed in Section III-C is always respected. To this aim, we implement a scenario where the leader vehicle continuously changes the reference speed v by an amount \bar{v} for each packet (i.e., every T seconds). In addition, we consider a channel causing burst losses at the receivers. In particular, each received packet has a certain probability of triggering a burst of losses. If a burst is triggered, the vehicle discards all the incoming packets received until the time $n_L T$ has elapsed, losing n_L consecutive packets for each vehicle. n_L is drawn from a discrete uniform distribution $\mathcal{U}(1, N_L)$. After the end of a burst, each receiver waits a minimum amount of time before starting the next one. The analysis on the bound is indeed valid when considering the system at steady state. After a burst of losses, the system




Figure 2: Qualitative comparison between a classic algorithm and the proposed solution (distance errors under a sinusoidal disturbance).




Figure 3: Spring-damper representation of the proposed control system.

needs a certain amount of time to converge (cf. Eq. (11)) to eliminate the accumulated error. However, we also consider very small network up-times (as small as 100 ms) to show the robustness of our approach. Finally, we consider a first order actuation lag with a time constant $\tau = 0.5$ s, i.e., the response of the engine and the braking system to actuation commands \ddot{y} is modeled by the transfer function $\ddot{y}_{\text{real}} = \frac{1}{\tau s + 1} \ddot{y}$, which is a common and verified assumption [4], [6]–[8]. Table II summarizes simulation parameters.

For each simulation s , we compute the norm of the error vector as

$$\|z_s\| = \max_k \sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^N (d_{k,i} - d)^2}, \quad (34)$$

where $d_{k,i}$ is the distance between vehicles V_i and V_{i-1} at simulation step k and d is the target distance. We then verify that $\|z_s\| \leq \|z\|_{\text{max}}$ for all the simulations, where $\|z\|_{\text{max}}$ is the theoretic bound for the norm, computed upon the parameters chosen for that particular simulation.

In the computation of the theoretic bound, however, the maximum jerk \bar{j} is not clearly defined. In the real world it can either be a physical limit of the engine or the braking system, or a design parameter. In the simulations there is no such limit. For this reason, we post-analyze the maximum jerks obtained in

Table II: Simulation parameters.

Parameter	Value
k, h, T, τ	0.5, 0.71, 100 ms, 0.5 s
r	$\sqrt{0.5}, 1, 4$
n_L	1, $\sim \mathcal{U}(1, 3)$, $\sim \mathcal{U}(1, 5)$
Start burst probability	1%, 5%, 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, and 50%
Minimum no-burst time	0.1 s, 0.3 s, 0.5 s, 1 s, and 3 s
\bar{v}	1 km/h per packet
Repetitions	10






Figure 4: Distribution of maximum jerks measured over all simulation runs.

the simulations. Figure 4 shows an histogram of the maximum jerk value of each simulation. Small maximum jerks (1.5 m/s^3 to 3.5 m/s^3) occur when packet loss events are unlikely and for small values of the r parameter. Recall that r balances the trade-off between settling time and driving comfort, so a higher value is more likely to cause large acceleration changes. Medium jerk values (5.5 m/s^3 to 8 m/s^3) are caused by a large value of the r parameter ($r = 4$), or a small r value combined with moderate packet losses. Finally, heavy losses cause large maximum jerk values, as the system obtains control data after long periods of silence, requiring strong actions to compensate the error. To compute the theoretic error bounds we use the minimum of the values shown in Fig. 4, i.e., 1.5 m/s^3 .

Figure 5 plots the simulation and theoretic bounds for different combinations of the r and N_L parameters. Simulation bounds are marked with points, while theoretic bounds are marked with crosses. The graph clearly shows that the theoretic bounds are respected. The margin between simulation and theory is large and this is due to two facts.

First, the bound $\|z\|_{max}$ is computed on the worst case: A change in the reference speed, a burst loss of N_L packets, and a change in the dynamics with the maximum jerk should occur at the same time. This is very unlikely even in a synthetic


 Figure 5: Plot of the simulation ($\|z_s\|$) and the theoretic ($\|z\|_{max}$) bounds, for different combinations of the r and N_L parameters. The $\|z\|_{max}$ values for $(r, N_L) = (4, 3)$ and $(4, 5)$ are out of scale and are not shown for the sake of clarity.

 Figure 6: Comparison of the speed dynamics when setting $v = 0 \text{ km/h}$ from $v = 100 \text{ km/h}$ with and w/o adaptive r .

scenario like the one we consider, especially because the jerk is a consequence of the control action computed by the algorithm.


Second, the predictor implemented within the control system counteracts the effects of packet losses, estimating the position and the speed of other vehicles during network down time. The effectiveness of the predictor is evident, as the impact of the burst length is smaller compared to the impact of r .

C. Emergency Braking


We tested the performance of the control system with respect to cruising, which is the main purpose of a platooning control algorithm. A platoon, however, is also required to react to emergencies and external inputs. One example is an emergency braking maneuver [17]. With “emergency braking” we refer here to the action of coming to a complete stop with a strong deceleration, that is a deceleration which can be perceived as uncomfortable by a passenger (more than 4 m/s^2 [18]).

Differently from conventional CACC systems, where the leader is controlled by an independent law, our design controls leader’s behavior as well. Setting the reference speed $v = 0$ is not enough, as the algorithm smoothly converges to the desired speed with a comfortable deceleration and not in “emergency mode”. To realize an emergency braking maneuver we thus need to modify controller parameters “on the fly”, in particular by acting on the desired speed v and the vehicle-reference friction coefficient r . Let us assume that the vehicle initiating the maneuver is traveling at speed v_0 . To implement the maneuver, we set $v = 0$ and $r = \frac{d_{dec}}{v_0}$, where d_{dec} is the desired deceleration. r is continuously updated and broadcast to the other vehicles, causing them to brake with a constant deceleration d_{dec} . Figure 6 shows the comparison between the two approaches when choosing a strong desired deceleration of 8 m/s^2 . When the leader sets the reference speed $v = 0$ (5 s simulation time) but does not adapt r , the platoon takes 15 s to come down to a complete stop, while when r is adapted to the situation of a sudden unforeseen stop the platoon comes to a complete stop in 3 s to 4 s. The average behavior is always smooth and depends only on how r is changed.


Figure 7 shows the differential dynamics of the maneuver in terms of relative vehicles distance in the same conditions of Fig. 6 in three different conditions: Without adapting r (Fig. 7a); adapting r (Fig. 7b); and adapting r when the maneuver is initiated by the fourth vehicle in the platoon V_3 and not by the first one V_0 as usual (Fig. 7c). As expected, dynamically changing r allows a faster deceleration, but ends in a larger



(a) No r adaptation, V_0 declares the stop



(b) Adapting r , V_0 declares the stop



(c) Adapting r , V_3 declares the stop

Figure 7: Comparison of the relative vehicles' position when setting $v = 0$ km/h from $v = 100$ km/h without adapting r (a), adapting r (b), and adapting r (c) when the stop is declared by V_3 .

spacing error, that remains in any case in the order of tens of cm. Interestingly, if the stop is declared by a vehicle in the middle of the platoon, a feature this controller enables, distance errors are smaller. After the platoon comes to a complete stop, the vehicles keep moving very slowly to bring the inter-vehicle distance exactly to d , but these are movements of centimeters and vehicles can be conveniently stopped at any distance if desired.

One observation to make in this scenario is that the theoretic bound $\|z\|_{max}$ is not valid during the emergency maneuvers, as the parameters of the controller change and the scenario is no more a standard cruise, but an emergency stop. The platoon, however, remains very stable and distances, as shown by results, remain well within safety, and indeed within the "cruising bound", even if it is not theoretically valid.

VI. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK

In this work we designed a cooperative automatic driving algorithm from a joint network and control perspective. We derived safety upper bounds on the inter-vehicle distance depending on vehicle dynamics and packet losses caused by network impairments, showing by means of simulations that such bounds are never violated. On the contrary, the bounds are respected with a large margin due to the robustness of the algorithm to packet losses. Hence, our future work

aims at reducing the theoretic error bound by considering the effect of a predictor or, alternatively, at designing an adaptive message dissemination algorithm that reduces the broadcast rate depending on the need. The latter objective would permit to minimize network utilization while still guaranteeing the safety and the robustness to the system. To the best of our knowledge, this would be a significant achievement.

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