An Access Control Framework for Business Processes for Web Services*

Hristo Koshutanski Fabio Massacci
Dip. di Informatica e Telecomunicazioni - Univ. di Trento
via Sommarive 14 - 38050 Povo di Trento (ITALY)
{hristo,massacci}@dit.unitn.it

ABSTRACT

Business Processes for Web Services are the new paradigm for the lightweight integration of business from different enterprises.

Whereas the security and access control policies for basic web services and distributed systems are well studied and almost standardized, there is not yet a comprehensive proposal for an access control architecture for business processes. The major difference is that business process describe complex services that cross organizational boundaries and are provided by entities that sees each other as just partners and nothing else.

This calls for a number of differences with traditional aspects of access control architectures such as

- credential vs classical user-based access control,
- interactive and partner-based vs one-server-gathers-all requests of credentials from clients,
- controlled disclosure of information vs all-or-nothing access control decisions,
- abducing missing credentials for fulfilling requests vs deducing entailment of valid requests from credentials in formal models,
- "source-code" authorization processes vs data describing policies for communicating policies or for orchestrating the work of authorization servers.

Looking at the access control field we find good approximation of most components but not their synthesis into one access control architecture for business processes for web services, which is the contribution of this paper.

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Management, Design, Security, Languages

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Web Services, Interactive Access Control, E-Business, Security Management, Distributed Systems Security, Controlled Disclosure.

1. INTRODUCTION

Middleware has been the enterprise integration buzzword at the end of the past millennium. Nowadays a new paradigm is starting to take hold: Web services (WS for short). Setting hype aside, the major difference between middleware solutions (CORBA, COM+, EJB, etc.) and WS is the idea of lightweight integration of business processes from different enterprises.

The security of basic WS is well studied and standardized [6]. There are also many approaches [35, 37, 4, 16, 13, 5, 33] for controlling access to services and trust management in distributed systems, and an advanced standardization process for policies and access control (see for instance the OASIS proposals [12, 26]). However, with the notable exceptions of provisional access control [22] and trust negotiation [36], access control models rest on the idea that the server picks the evidence you sent on who you are (credentials) and what you want (request), checks its evidence on what you deserve (policies) and makes one-off decisions.

Moving up in the WS hierarchy from single services to *orchestration and choreography of WS and business processes* the picture changes. Business processes describe complex services that cross organizational boundaries and are provided by partners.

The paradigmatic example in the WS standards is a travel agent WS that must orchestrate a combination of plane and train tickets, car rental, hotel booking and insurance, each service offered by different partner which may or may not be involved according to the actual unrolling of the workflow.

For example consider the problem of going to a nice "Shakespearian Tour" in Italy: you might decide to go to the city of Shylock, and from there rent a car and travel to Romeo and Juliet's last resort, to jump then on a train and visit the Senate's seat where Pompeous spoke after Caesar's death. However, you might as well decide to travel instead to Germany first and then the train to Verona from there. In the first case you might need to use a car rental company. The second path may require to contact a German train company for the schedule, which is not needed if you land directly in Italy.

Let us now consider the problem of "lightweight" credentials such as the German train discount card or the car rental gold member card. Should the user provide them anyway at the beginning? Obviously not. Should the server orchestrating the process require each partner to publish its policy on discounts? Obviously not.

Such problems are not simply problems of practicality, but have major security implications:

1. Credential vs identity based access control – A WS is something you publish on the Web for everybody to use it, so its design should be fairly close to the principles of trust management systems [5, 33];

2. Orchestrating vs combining – *partners* have different security policies and are just partners and not part of the same enterprise. They may not wish to disclose their policies to the servent orchestrating the request. So, we cannot simply combine the policies, we need to orchestrate the request grant/deny/process of many different policies/partners.

3. Interactive vs one-off access control – if partners have different policies they might as well require different credentials to a client. Privacy considerations make gathering all potentially needed credentials from clients difficult. Furthermore, this may simply be impossible. An airline may want to ask confidential information directly to its frequent fliers (e.g., confirmation of religious preferences for the food) and not to the Web travel agent orchestrator of the process. This calls for an interactive process in which the client may be asked on the fly for additional credentials and may grant or deny such requests[1].

4. Abducing vs deducing credentials – in most classical formal models of access control we deduce that a request is valid because it is entailed by the combination of the policy and the set of available credentials. Here, a partner must be able to infer the causes of some failed request to ask the missing credentials to the client. The corresponding logical process is no longer deduction but it is abduction. So we must have co-existence of deduction (for deciding access and release of information) and abduction (for explaining failed accesses).

5. Data vs source level communication – the choice of format for messages is always rather complicated, as it calls for the implementation of software that is able to interpret its meaning. In a Business Process scenario we no longer need messages, but just "mobile" processes. A client will receive a business process so that he can simply execute the source to obtain and send the missing credential. An authorization server can download a business process from a policy orchestrator and obtain the desired authorization.

[1]Note that the workflow may even take completely different paths based on the results of interaction. For example a rent-a-car operator may require a signed credit card number plus a physical address. The client may deny such requirement and thus another operator may be chosen that only asks for a credit card number.

Looking at the access control field we find a good approximation of most components: we have proposals for combining policies at the logical level [23, 34, 3] and at the architectural level [26]. We have proposals for calculi for controlling release of information [7], and procedures for trust negotiations and communication of credentials [36], architecture for distributed access control [12, 4, 35, 16, 24].

What is missing is a way to synthesize *all* these aspects into one access control architecture for business processes of WS, which is the contribution of this paper.

1.1 Plan of the Paper

In the next section we introduce some notion about WS and Business Processes for WS. Then we present our architecture and discuss how the entire message passing scheme can be implemented as "mobile" processes in XML. Section 6 explains how we can use logical deduction and logical abduction to build a firm foundation for the interactive process of inferring disclosable credentials from access control policies and from release policies. A brief discussion of related works concludes the paper.

2. A PRIMER ON WS AND BUSINESS PROCESSES

A Web Service as defined by the standard [21] is "an interface that describes a collection of operations that are network-accessible through standardized XML messaging. A Web service is described using a standard, formal XML notion, called its *service description*. It covers all the details necessary to interact with the service, including message formats (that detail the operations), transport protocols and location."

The idea behind Web services is to encapsulate and make available enterprise resources in a new heterogeneous and distributed way.

The WS architecture, as defined by W3C [32], is divided into five layers grouped into three main components - Wire, Description, and Discovery (Figure 1). The *Wire* component comprises the messaging and transport layers with the SOAP protocol and the XML message format. *Discovery* offers users a unified and systematic way to find, discover, and inspect service providers over the Internet. There are two standards proposed at this level - Universal Description, Discovery and Integration (UDDI) and Web Service Inspection Language (WSIL).

Moving upward we found the *Service Description* layer and the *Business Process Orchestration* layer. The service description layer is responsible for describing the basic format of offered services (protocols and encodings, where a service resides, and how to invoke it). The standard for describing the communication details at this layer is Web Service Description Language (WSDL).

The Business Process Orchestration layer is an extension of the service model defined at the description layer. This



Figure 1: Web Services Technology Stack & Access Control Issues




```
<process>
    <sequence>
        <receive partner="Customer"
                 portType="purchaseOrderPT"
                 operation="SendPurchaseOrder"
                 container="PO">
        </receive>
        <invoke  partner="CreditBureau"
                 portType="CheckCreditPT"
                 operation="CheckCredit">
        </invoke>
        <invoke partner="shippingProvider"
                portType="shippingPT"
                operation="RequestShipping"
                inputContainer="shipingRequest"
                outputContainer="shippingInfo">
                    <source linkName="ship-to-invoice">
        </invoke>
        <reply partner="Customer"
               portType="purchaseOrderPT"
               operation="SendPurchaseOrder"
               container="Invoice"/>
    </sequence>
</process>
```

Figure 2: Example of BPEL4WS Process

layer is responsible for describing the behavior of complex business and workflow processes. Intuitively, business processes are graphs where each node represents a business activity and primitive nodes are in WSDL. The recently released standard at this layer is the Business Process Execution Language for WS (BPEL4WS) [10].

The BPEL4WS primitive activities are the following:

`<invoke>` invoking an operation on some Web service;
`<receive>` waiting for an operation to be invoked by someone externally;
`<reply>` generating the response of an input/output operation;
`<assign>` copying data from one place to another.

More complex activities can be constructed by composition:

`<sequence>` - allows the developer to define an ordered sequence of steps;
`<switch>` - allows the developer to have branching;
`<while>` - allows the developer to define a loop;
`<flow>` - allows the developer to define that a collection of steps has to be executed in parallel.

An example of compositions of services is shown in Figure 2: a buyer service is ordering goods from a seller service, i.e. the buyer service invokes the order method on the seller



Figure 3: Cross-section view of the architecture

service, whose interface is defined using WSDL. The seller service invokes a credit validation service to ensure that the buyer can pay for the goods and after that continue by shipping the goods to the buyer. The credit validation service can take place at a credit bureau site in a separate security domain. Notice that a number of partners participate in the process that therefore crosses administrative boundaries.

The XML code shown in Figure 2 is a very brief example of the scenario described above in the notations of BPEL4WS primitives. The structure of the processing section is defined by the `<sequence>` element, which states that the elements contained inside are executed in this order. The node content is self explanatory.

3. ARCHITECTURE

Combining the traditional proposals for distributed access control and the essential components used for Web services we propose here a security architecture for orchestrating authorization of Web Services Processes.

Figure 3 shows view of the architecture. A brief description of the entities is given below.

AttributeServer is responsible for providing group/role membership information as in [35, 37], for instance in the form of membership and non-membership certificates.

RegistryServer is responsible for maintaining relations between services and service providers implementing a particular service. When a Client requests the RegistryServer for a specific service, the latter responds with a list of ApplicationServers implementing the requested service.

AuthorizationServer decouples the authorization logic from the application logic. It is responsible for *locating*, *executing*, and *managing* all needed PolicyEvaluators, and returning an appropriate result to the ApplicationServer. Also it is responsible for managing all the *interactions* with the Client.

PolicyEvaluator terminology borrowed from Beznosov et al [4], is an entity responsible for achieving endpoint decisions on access control (see Figure 3). All partners involved in a business process are likely to be as different entities, each of them represented by a PolicyEvaluator.

PolicyOrchestrator from the authorization point of view is an entity responsible for the workflow level access and release control. It decides which are the partners that are involved in the requested service (Web service workflow) and on the base of some orchestration security policies to combine the corresponding PolicyEvaluators in a form of a Web process (*Policy Composition*

Process) that is suitable for execution by the AuthorizationServer.

Figure 4 shows an horizontal view of the same architecture with multiple servers.

To secure the entire architecture we must make some assumptions on the security properties of the lower levels. At transport level we assume the adoption of the WS-Security specification [6] that describes enhancements to SOAP messaging to provide message integrity, confidentiality, and authentication. For the message level one can use the W3C and IETF specification for XML-Signature [25] and W3C XML-Encryption [14], or the recently release specifications by IBM and Microsoft for WS secure conversations [18, 19].

One of the advantages of using BPEL4WS is that it is possible to implement the entire architecture using BPEL4WS. In this framework, each component is a business process that communicate with others via web services[2] We plan to use the BPEL generator Collaxa for a sophisticated implementation that includes also the actual verification of credentials[3].

At this stage one may wonder why do we need a PolicyOrchestrator at all. The AuthorizationServer could as well contact all PolicyEvaluators on its own. Instead we have decided to decouple the problem in two parts: *deciding* the authorization process, and *running* it. The AuthorizationServer runs the actual authorization process and thus queries all the PolicyEvaluators that are needed. The entity burdened with the task of deciding what authorization process should be run is PolicyOrchestrator.

We free the AuthorizationServer from bothering about all the details around connections between partners and PolicyEvaluators, as well as, PolicyEvaluator's description, location, orchestration, etc. The PolicyOrchestrator is responsible for the *Policy Composition Service*: maintaining all relations between resources names (services) and policies, selecting which are the partners involved in the requested process and combining the corresponding PolicyEvaluators (as mentioned before) in a policy composition process and link them to the workflow level access and release policies. This is possible because the AuthorizationServer can just download and run a business process as we'll discuss in the next section.

4. COMMUNICATION AS "MOBILE" PROCESSES

Assuming security at lower level, the second key component is the format of communications. We propose here a major innovation: the typical exchange of messages in access control system is at "data" level (credentials, policies, requests, objects, etc.) that are interpreted by the recipients. This choice makes the actual implementation of proposed access control infrastructure difficult and often not easily portable. Here, we propose to exchange messages at "source code" level and in particular at the level of business process description. We advocate *mobility of authorization of business processes*. It means that instead of sending just messages that have to be interpreted by entities, we truly have mobile processes passing from one entity to another indicating themselves what the recipient has to do.

We have decided to use the term *mobile process* because it well expresses the idea of using mobile code together with the functionality of Web processes. The main advantages of using mobile processes in our authorization framework are flexibility and simplicity of entities. The recipient of mobile process is not limited to the functions and computational algorithms that the recipient's logic predefines. Migrations of actors in the system from one server to another is easier with mobile processes and the system as a whole is more flexible. Entities in the framework becomes simpler, having little functionality pre-engineered into them.

Thus, a quick implementation of a server only needs an off-the-shelf interpreter for business processes. Leading this approach at an extreme the AuthorizationServer can simply receive a business process from the orchestrator and execute it. The process may still be computationally intensive as an AuthorizationServer may have to process thousands or millions of authorization workflows, but it could be logically very simple thus reducing the TCB to the simple execution of certified processes from certified sources.

Another reason is that some PolicyEvaluators may decide to disclose their XACML policies to the entity coordinating the proposal and others PolicyEvaluators may instead decide to offer an external interface, so that they just specify a container for requests and an output container for its decision. All intermediate choices are possible if we allow the AuthorizationServer just to follow an arbitrary business process as certified by the PolicyOrchestrator.

5. INTERACTION WITH THE CLIENT

The next important step in advocating mobile processes is to specify a language that is needed for coding them. We have identified it as a *language for communicating interactive requests back to a* Client. This is even in the case when a Client is an AuthorizationServer waiting for a response either from a PolicyOrchestrator or from a PolicyEvaluator. This language can be designed with a black box view of the PolicyEvaluator but must be easily interpretable from the Client side. Thus we propose to use BPEL4WS itself as a language in which requests are coded. The PolicyEvaluator/PolicyOrchestrator must represent its request as a WS business process that can then be interpreted and executed by the Client. If the PolicyEvaluator wants part of the request to be only visible to the Client it can use the available XML-crypto features [25, 14] to protect the relevant part.

Loosely speaking we may say that the Client starts by executing a simple `<invoke>R</invoke>` and obtain in return either its result or a more complicated process to execute. For example a BPEL4WS interactive request may specify a `<input container>` where to put a digitally signed copy of the travel contract sealed with the public key of the rent-a-car company (a process that can be specified as a `<sequence>` of events).

The idea is intuitive and appealing but there is an essential detail that must be taken care of. Notably, the AuthorizationServer will receive a number of interactive requests while controlling its workflow and the combination of these requests and the service workflow specification is essential. The simplest solution is to ignore such interaction: all interactive requests are compiled into a `<flow>` and the result

[2]This creates a recursive problem of access control: if the the PolicyEvaluator publishes its services as a web service, who can access these services? For the time being we'll swipe that problem under the carpet, and assume that this is done by a good old access list of authorized AuthorizationServer using a suitable authentication mechanism at lower levels.

[3]At present credentials are just textual expressions and public key operations are not performed.



Figure 4: Horizontal view of the architecture

is sent back to the Client. Such solution is hardly satisfactory from the point of view of the Client: we often want to know "why" some additional information is needed. See the example of Figure 2: at some stage somebody may ask for a digitally signed declaration about our address. We may consider this request fair enough from the shipping agent, but not from the credit checking bureau. So, each BPEL4WS interactive request is supplemented with a special tag [root/context]:

- root requests will be compiled with a `<flow>` construct and returned together with the overall result of the computation for contextual requests;
- contextual requests the PolicyOrchestrator will make a copy of the WS process (*not* the authorization process) and replace each step S for which an additional request I has been called with the request and a context indicating the WS (partner and all) that required the additional credential. The PolicyOrchestrator will then prune the WS process removing all nodes that were not on a path from the root to the newly modified nodes and sends the result to the Client.

The last step is necessary to protect the overall workflow from unnecessary disclosure. Notice that the context workflow is not to be executed by the client. The client must only execute the authorization workflow. So, to avoid complications, we have used a container where the context workflow is stored for the client to see it, if he he wants to know why certain credential are needed.

This combination is sufficiently adequate for most uses, but still it offers the PolicyOrchestrator just the choice of compiling individual requests rather than combining them. Here we have identified an important point in the PolicyOrchestrator where we need to introduce a new language - a *language for combination of policies and interactive requests at workflow level*. So far, we have not found a proposal that is entirely satisfactory, part because there are not enough case studies of WS Business Processes to guide the selection of policies at workflow level.

The proposal by Bertino et al. [2], is fairly expressive but only focuses on implementing snapshot constraints on a workflow level (i.e. safety properties). So it is not possible to express properties such as "if Y is repeatedly true then eventually X should happen".

The usage of algebraic constructs based on dynamic logic proposed by Wijesekera and Jajodia [34] seems more promising. Indeed `<invoke>` operation would be mapped into single action, `<sequence>` into sequential compounder, `<switch>` into non deterministic choice (each case represented by a test) and `<flow>` by intersection. This does not mean that we would use dynamic logic for actual implementation[4], but rather that the logical language may offer a formal foundation to policy written in BPEL4WS.

6. THE ABDUCTION OF MISSING CREDENTIALS

For the deployment of the architecture, the PolicyEvaluator must be able to determine the set of additional credential that are necessary to obtain a service in case of failure. This problem may of course be shifted on the implementors of PolicyEvaluators, as the architecture only needs that the

[4]This is less critical than prejudice may suggest. The ML implementation of Peter Patel-Schneider at Bell-Labs can actually crack significant dynamic logic theorems in milliseconds.

outcome of this derivation is mapped into some BPEL4WS process that is then sent to the client.

However, there is no algorithm in either the formal or the practical models of access control and trust negotiations to derive such credentials from the access control policy. The works on trust negotiations [29, 36] focus on communication and infrastructure and assume that requests and counter requests can be somehow calculated from the access policy. The formal models on credential-based access control and policy combination [2, 23, 15, 34] don't treat the problem of inferring missing credentials from failed requests, as they are within the frame of mind of inferring successful requests from present credentials. Also standardization efforts like the XACML proposals [12] gives rules for deriving what is right (evaluating policies) and not rule for understanding what went wrong.

Also a recent proposal by Bonatti and Samarati [7] that has the explicit focus on access and release control is too preliminary and unsatisfactory. In a nutshell, the request is received, the policy rules are filtered for relevance, the relevant rules are partially evaluated and sent to the client. The client will have to figure out which are the credentials (this is not discussed in the paper), and then will evaluate these credentials according its release policy.

The first problem is that demanding clients to analyse security policies is not acceptable here. We only assume an interpreter of Business Processes on the client side (possibly with some crytpo capabilities if some digital signatures are needed), and thus all analysis of logical policies should be performed elsewhere. The second problem is that after a suitable number of queries the entire policy of the server would be disclosed to the client or to the server orchestrating the process. This is hardly acceptable from the perspective of a WS business partner. Furthermore, the relevancy filtering approach only works for flat policies, in which for every request we list all its credentials. The relevancy selection procedure in [7] is not correct already for the simple example that we show in Figure 5.

The other key proposal on trust negotiation by Yu et al. [36], offers a dual view w.r.t Bonatti and Samarati [7]. Loosely speaking, each credential is associated to a policy (a boolean expression) denoting the credentials that a client must have already provided for its safe disclosure, by a step wise process the parties can exchange credentials or policy rules (as in Bonatti and Samarati [7]) until the desired resource is released. The papers provide for safe sequences of disclosure in a rather ad-hoc fashion building upon trees rather than logical formalization. As a consequence they can only treat monotone policies and it is not possible to define notions of consistency of policies and disclosure of policies in presence of constraints (e.g. separation of duty). The major limitation of the paper is that it interlock the access and the release policy into one. So, as the authors acknowledge [36, page. 21], it is impossible to access resources if some of the needed credentials cannot be disclosed at some point. Furthermore, the need for intermediate credential disclosure calls for a structuring of policy rules that is counter-intuitive from the point of view of access control. For instance, a policy rules may say that for access to the full text of on-line journal article we must have already got the access to browsing the journal table of content, plus additional credentials. Access to table of contents could then specify some simpler set of credentials. For the disclosure process to take place such natural composition is not possible when using Yu et al. framework [36].

We propose a more general and principled approach based on logic that allows for a clean solution of these problems. For sake of simplicity (and popularity), assume that the policy is expressed using Datalog rules or logic programs with the stable model semantics (if we need negation to implement some constraints like separation of duties). What we need is a logical implementation of the following process:

1. the PolicyEvaluator receives the credentials and evaluates the request against the policy augmented with the credentials i.e. whether the request is a logical consequence of the policy and the credentials;
2. if the request is granted nothing needs to be done;
3. if the request fails we evaluate the given credential against a release policy of the PolicyEvaluator to infer which are the credentials whose need can be disclosed on the basis of the credentials already received;
4. abduce the actually needed credentials by re-evaluating the request against the policy and considering the potentially disclosable credentials determined at the previous step; only the needed credential are communicated to the client.

In a nutshell, what we need for the implementation of PolicyEvaluator is to implement two main inference capabilities: *deduction* and *abduction* [31]. We need to use deduction to infer whether a request can be granted on the basis of the present credentials as in [7, 2, 23, 15], we use abduction to explain which minimum set of credentials would be necessary to grant a failed request. Obviously it is not necessary to use logic, what we claim is that the underlying logical constructs that we need for our access decisions are these two conceptually different operation.

Definition 6.1 (Access Control). *Let P_A be a stratified logic program representing an access control policy, r be an atom representing a request, C be a set of atoms representing a set of given credentials, then the* request is granted *iff $P_R \cup C \models r$.*

Definition 6.2 (Release Control). *Let P_R be a stratified logic program representing a release control policy, d be an atom representing a credential, C be a set of atoms representing a set of given credentials, then the* credential d is disclosable *iff $P_R \cup C \models d$.*

The notion of release control subsumes the notion of "policy" that is used by Yu et al. [36]. Indeed, a step of the negotiation process by trust builder can now be explained either as a successful entailment (the disclosure of a credential) or the disclosure of a logic rule.

Definition 6.3 (AC Failures Explanation). *Let P_A and P_R be a stratified logic programs representing respectively an access control policy and a release control policy, r be an atom representing a request, C be a set of atoms representing a set of given credentials, an* admissible explanation(abduction) of missing credentials *is any set of credentials C_M such that*

1. $P_A \cup C \not\models r$

2. $P_A \cup C \cup C_M \models r$

3. $P_A \cup C \cup C_M$ *is consistent*

4. $P_R \cup C \models c$ *for all* $c \in C_M$

The first conditions says that the missing credentials are indeed needed. The second condition says that they are sufficient and the last condition says that they are actually meaningful and don't lead to inconsistency (say because of separtion of duties). The last condition specify that credential must be disclosable. In presence of positive Datalog program such as for Bonatti and Samarati's logic [7], Li's Delegation Logic [23], Samarati et al. authorization framework [30], the consistency condition is satisfied by default. In presence of constraints on the execution or negation as failure, as in Bertino et al. Datalog programs for workflow policies [2] — which can be easily augmented with credentials — the consistency condition is essential to guarantee that the abduced set of atoms makes sense. Indeed, constraints could make $P_R \cup C \cup C_M$ inconsistent and therefore it would not make much sense to say that the request r should be granted from a system.

In most definitions of abduction we also have constraints on the *minimality of the solution* wrt some partial ordering. Traditional requirements are minimality wrt set-containment and set-cardinality. In presence of role hierarchies additional ordering can be defined. These requirements make the problem harder than deduction from a computational complexity point of view but are usually desirable form the view points of simplicity of interaction and information-flow control. We discuss this issue in details in another paper [20].

In Figure 5 is shown a sample policy of the university online library access and release rules. The notations for declarations, credentials, and services are borrowed from Bonatti and Samarati [7]. Here `decl` means that it is a statement (e.g., identity, address) declared by the client, while `cred` is a statement declared and signed by a key corresponding to some trusted authority. Rule 4 that says "to have access to service `reading` the client should have access to library (presenting Id and some library card) and a loan library card". Rule 10 says "to reveal the need for a loan library credential there should be a declaration of the library's Id and some library credential".

Notice that here is no way to disclose the need for a credential such as $\text{cred}(card(user, john, id1568), bibK)$. Such credential must be given. The same is true for the declaration about the university employee id which cannot be disclosed. However, the lack of a rule for disclosure of a credential does not forbid us to use the very same credential in some access rule.

If the PolicyEvaluator is given the declaration $\text{decl}(id1568)$ and the credential $\text{cred}(card(user, john, id1568), bibK)$, together with the request for reading the journal articles online. The query $\text{serv}(reading)$ does not follows from the policy and the given declarations and credentials. So, we apply the release policy and infer that the following credentials are disclosable:

$$\begin{gathered}\text{decl}(john, cs), \text{decl}(id1568),\\ \text{cred}(researcher(id1568, cs), csK),\\ \text{cred}(card(user, john, id1568), bibK),\\ \text{cred}(member(john, cs), csK),\\ \text{cred}(card(loan, john, id1568), bibK).\end{gathered}$$

The abduction algorithm derive two possible answers for the credentials:

$$\begin{aligned} C_{M1} &= \{\text{decl}(john, cs), \text{cred}(member(john, cs), csK)\}\\ C_{M2} &= \{\text{cred}(card(loan, john, id1568), bibK)\}\end{aligned}$$

Both sets are minimal with respect to the subset inclusion ordering and only C_{M2} is minimal with respect to a set cardinality ordering. In case the first set is chosen the PolicyEvaluator will compile a `<flow>` node for sending the requests back to the client.

It could be possible to avoid the presence of the release policy by adding an additional field to a credential that can be requested. Each time any such credential would be required to be true in the logical evaluation of the policy, we trigger an action sending the request to the client.

However, we believe that the separation of access and release policies is useful for practical reason in spite of the additional complication that the two-policies system requires for evaluation. The double query system is immaterial to the human administrator who might simply buy a faster machine. In contrast, the specification of policies is normally done by humans and is costly and error prone process. The integration of release and access policy into one policy would imply that a change in the release policy requires modification to the access policy which might have been unchanged. Furthermore the separation of access and release policies allows for separation of duties among administrators: one administrator can modify the access policy and another the release policy.

The use of abduction of missing credential is sufficient for the description of stateless business processes. Namely for business processes in which only the set of credential exhibited by the client is examined. If PolicyEvaluators store past credentials (for instance to avoid that somebody takes up two incompatible roles within a short time frame), it is necessary to revise the access control process to allow for the logical revocation of credentials. This is discussed elsewhere [20].

7. CONCLUSIONS AND RELATED WORK

As we have already discussed, a number of access control models have been proposed for workflows [2], web services [27], and role based access control on the web [11, 28], SOAP messages [8], entire XML documents [1, 9], tasks [17] and DRM [27], possibly coupled by sophisticated policy combination algorithms. However, they have mostly remained within the classical framework. Even more liberal models such as those for DRM based on usage [27] has assumed that servers know their clients pretty well: they might not know their names but they know everything about what, when, and how can be used by these clients. We have discussed the proposals of Bonatti and Samarati [7] and Yu et al. [36] more in details in Section 6.

If we look at the proposals for distributed access control architectures [35, 37, 4, 16] the common thread is decoupling access control logic from application logic, and possibly distribute the access control component. However we are still within the same administrative boundaries.

For instance Woo and Lam [35] propose that the ApplicationServer offloads its authorization policy to an AuthorizationServer. After evaluating the policy the Authoriza-

Access Policy:

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{serv}(query()) &\leftarrow \text{decl}(Id), \text{cred}(card(Type, Name, Id), biblioK) && (1)\\
\text{serv}(query(citations)) &\leftarrow \text{serv}(access), \text{cred}(member(Name, Dept), K_D), assoc(Dept, K_D) && (2)\\
\text{serv}(booking) &\leftarrow \text{decl}(Name, Dept), \text{cred}(card(loan, Name, Id), biblioK) && (3)\\
\text{serv}(reading) &\leftarrow \text{serv}(access), \text{cred}(card(loan, Name, Id), biblioK) && (4)\\
\text{serv}(reading) &\leftarrow \text{cred}(academic(Name, UnivId), K_U), assoc(university, K_U) && (5)\\
\text{serv}(reading) &\leftarrow \text{serv}(query(citations)), \text{cred}(researcher(Name, Dept), K_D), assoc(Dept, K_D) && (6)
\end{aligned}$$

Release Policy:

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{decl}(Name, Dept) &\leftarrow \text{decl}(Id) && (7)\\
\text{cred}(researcher(Name, Dept), K_D) &\leftarrow \text{decl}(Name, Dept), \text{cred}(card(Type, Name, Id), bibK) && (8)\\
\text{cred}(member(Name, Dept), K_D) &\leftarrow \text{decl}(Name, Dept) && (9)\\
\text{cred}(card(loan, Name, Id), bibK) &\leftarrow \text{decl}(Id), \text{cred}(card(Type, Name, Id), bibK) && (10)\\
\text{cred}(academic(Name, UnivId), K_U) &\leftarrow \text{decl}(UnivId), \text{decl}(Name, Dept) && (11)
\end{aligned}$$

Figure 5: University Library WS Access and Release Policies

tionServer hands out authorization certificate to the Client, which the Client has to present along with its request.

An architecture close to ours has been proposed by Beznosov et al. [4]. Authorizations are managed by an Authorization Service, and its Access Decision Object (ADO). The ADO obtains references to all PolicyEvaluators related to the Client's request, asks a decision combinator for combining decisions according to a combination policy, and returns the decision back to the Client. Also the Akenti Policy Engine [16], the OASIS system [13], and the Adage system [37], share the idea of an AuthorizationServer communicating with application and various IdentityServers to obtain credentials for the Client.

In comparison with the OASIS framework [12]: the ApplicationServer acts as PEP; the PolicyEvaluator acts partly as PAP in the case of making available policies to the AuthorizationServer and acts partly as PDP in taking authorization decisions and providing them to the AuthorizationServer; the AuthorizationServer acts partly as "context handler" in receiving requests from the ApplicationServer and sending access decisions back to it and in collecting attributes from an AttributeServer. It acts partly as PDP in the case of taking an authorization decision from policies returned by PolicyEvaluators (acting as PAPs) and applying some rules on them; the PolicyOrchestrator acts partly as "context handler" in requesting (giving a source to) the AuthorizationServer that interprets the source and returns the result back to it. It also acts partly as PDP in taking authorization decisions on the base of applying some policies available on the workflow level – acting in this case as PAP.

In most proposals, the possibility that servers may get back to the calling Clients with some counter requests is not considered. This even in the case where the Client is actually an AuthorizationServer querying different PolicyEvaluator servers.

In this paper we have proposed a solution to address the challenges of WS processes: a possible architecture for the authorization of business processes for Web services. We have identified an interactive access control model as a way for protecting security interests wrt disclosure of information and access control of both servers and clients. Logical abduction is the solid semantical foundation upon which interaction can be build.

In the model a Client interacts (contracts) with the servent in order to finalize the necessary set of credentials needed to satisfy all partners' requirements related to the process. We propose to use "mobile" processes as messages exchanged in the architecture, and specified how entities in the architecture can be implemented using WS processes themselves.

Future work is in the direction of studying the complexity of the combined deduction and abduction process, for the particular restricted policy that are typically used in formulating workflow and WS security policies.

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