

Logics for Data and Knowledge Representation

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
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The order of the names is alphabetical.



Outline



- Introduction
- Syntax
- Semantics
 - intensions
 - entailment
- Reasoning
 - DP Procedure

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Introduction

- Despite all the several representation languages, all **knowledge** representation languages deal with sentences.
- Sentences are **propositions** (by definition).
- Propositional logic deals with propositions.
- As propositional logic is the **simplest logic** that does this, it is the right place to start.

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Language

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Language (Syntax)

- The first step in setting up a formal language (viz. a **propositional language**, PL) is to list the symbols, that is, the **alphabet of symbols**.
- We denote the alphabet of a propositional language by Σ_0 . So, PL is a **symbolic language**.
- Symbols in Σ_0 are divided in '**descriptive**' (nonlogical) and '**non-descriptive**' (logical).

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Logical Symbols (non-descriptive)

- 1. Propositional constants: A, B, ...
- 2. **Logical constants** ("Boolean operators"):
 \wedge, \vee, \neg
- 3. Parentheses (auxiliary symbols): (,)
- 4. **Propositional variables**: P, Q, ..., ψ, θ ...
- **Remark**: not only characters but also **words** like e.g. "monkey", "LDKR," etc. are in 4.

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Defined Symbols

- Logical **defined constants** are, for all P:
 - \perp (falshood symbol): $\perp \stackrel{\text{df}}{=} P \wedge \neg P$
 - \top (truth symbol): $\top \stackrel{\text{df}}{=} \neg \perp$
- **Remark:**
Defined symbols are *not* strictly necessary.
- They increase the usability by reducing the syntactic complexity of propositions.

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Formation Rules (FR)

- Atomic Formulas (**atomic propositions**):
1. A, B, ..., P, Q, ...; \perp , \top .
- Propositional Formulas (**propositions**), also called **well-formed formulas**, in short **wff's**):
2. All the atomic formulas.
3. $\neg P$, $P \wedge Q$, $P \vee Q$ for all wff's P, Q.
- Σ_0 + FR define a **propositional language**.

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Remark

- Propositions (wff's in PL) are the "**correct**" **formal expression** to be built from Σ_0 .
- **Example:**
 - 'inLab(Monkey)' or also 'inLab-Monkey', 'inlab-monkey', 'in-lab-monkey' are correct (with meaning T in our example);
 - 'inLab(high)', 'inLab(Monkey) ^', 'P \neg ^ Q' are not correct (i.e. with no meaning).

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Important Remark!

- Observe the two equivalent propositions:
 - 'inLab(Monkey)' (*) and 'inLab-Monkey'.
- 'Monkey' does **not** represent an **individual of some domain**; we have not such an expressiveness in PL! (We need class-PL.)
- Parentheses in 'inLab(Monkey)' are **not** the auxiliary symbols like in e.g. $(P \wedge \neg Q) \vee Q$
- The **semantics** of (*) in PL and FOL **differ!**

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Example (MB)

- Take the Monkey-Bananas problem.
- Some **significant data** are: the monkey, the bananas, the box, positions A, B...
- **Significant knowledge** is: Low, High, Go, ClimbOn...
- All other data and knowledge are **irrelevant!**

"There is a **monkey** in a laboratory with some **bananas** hanging out of reach from the ceiling. A **box** is available that will enable the monkey to reach the bananas if he **climbs on it**. Initially, the monkey is at **A**, the bananas at **B**, and the box at **C**. The monkey and box have height **Low**, but if the monkey climbs onto the box he will have height **High**, the same as the bananas. [...]"

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Example (MB, cont')

- **Language:** 'Monkey', 'Bananas', 'Box', 'Ceiling', 'A', 'B', 'C'; 'inLab-Monkey', 'inLab-Bananas', 'inLab-Box', 'high-Bananas', 'low-Monkey', ...
- **blue** wff's: data, **red** wff's: knowledge.
- **Important Remark:**
In PL we cannot **reason** by using 'Monkey' and 'inLab-Monkey' to conclude something on the monkey as an individual in the world.

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Example (MB, cont')

- Intended interpretation (**informal semantics**):
 - 'Monkey' is intended to be a monkey,
 - 'Bananas' is intended to be some bananas
 - ...
 - 'inLab-Monkey' is intended to say that a monkey is in a laboratory...
 - **data**
 - **knowledge**
 - ...
 - 'high-Bananas' is intended to say that some bananas are high to be reached, ... etc.

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Propositional Theory

- **Definition.** A set of propositions is a **propositional** (or sentential) **theory**.
- **NB:** a propositional theory is a (propositional) **knowledge base**.
- Recall that:
 - knowledge is a "statement"
 - we assumed statements are propositions.

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Propositional Theories and Databases

- A propositional theory is not a **data base**!
- Propositions **don't show data explicitly**
 - **Example:** In 'inLab(Monkey)', 'Monkey' does not refer to an individual from some data domain.
- In PL the form $P(a)$ must be **interpreted** as $P-a$ (so the use of form $P(a)$ is ambiguous).

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Example + Remark

- **Example:** A propositional theory, i.e., a **knowledge base** (KB) for the MB problem is a set like this:

{inLab-Monkey, inLab-Bananas, inLab-Box, high-Bananas, low-Monkey, isAtMonkey-A, isAtBananas-B, isAtBox-C, ClimbMonkeyBox \wedge isAtBox-B} \rightarrow reachMonkey-Bananas,...}
- **Remark:** The notion of **theory** / **KB** is a **syntactic** notion (i.e. no meaning in symbols).

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Semantics

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Semantics

- So far the elements of our propositional language are simply strings of symbols
 - without formal meaning**
- The meanings which are intended to be attached to the symbols and propositions form the **intended interpretation** of the language (viz. its symbols, formulas, etc.).

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Semantics

- We must make sure to assign the **formal meanings** out of our **intended interpretation** to the language, so that formulas (propositions) express what we intended.
- This is done by defining a **formal model M**.
- Technically: we have to define a pair (M, \models) for our propositional language (see below).

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Intensional Semantics Intensions (Definition)

- **Definition.** The **intension of a proposition** is the sum of all the properties that *must* be possessed by every particular to which the proposition can be applied.

The intension consists of all the **properties** the proposition **implies** (Rescher, 1964).

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Example

- Take the proposition 'airplane':
- Airplanes may differ in many ways, but anything to which one properly refers to by using the proposition 'airplane' will have to have certain **specifiable properties**, e.g. be self-propelled, man-made, having wings, etc.
- These **specifiable properties** go to define the **intension** of the proposition 'airplane'.

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Intensional Interpretation

- **Definition.** The **intensional interpretation** I of a proposition P , denoted by $I(P)$, is the intension of P .
- **Example 1:** $I(\text{'airplane'}) = \{\text{self-propelled, man-made, having wings, ...}\}$
- **Example 2:** $I(\text{'inLab-Monkey'}) = \{\text{there is a monkey, there is a lab, the monkey is in the lab}\}$

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Intensions versus Truth-Values

- The intensional interpretation of a proposition determines its truth-value.
- **Example:** Proposition 'airplane' is true iff airplanes are
 - self-propelled **and**
 - man-made **and**
 - have wings **or**
 - fly **and**
 - are **not** birds, ...

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Truth-values

- In intensional semantics, the central notion is that of 'truth valuation'.
- **Definition.** A **truth valuation** on a propositional language L is a mapping v assigning to each formula P of L a truth value $v(P)$, i.e., a member of the set $\{\text{True, False}\}$ (in short $\{T, F\}$), defined as follows.

[see the next slide]

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Truth-valuation v

- $v(\neg P) = \text{True}$ iff $v(P) = \text{False}$
- $v(P \wedge Q) = \text{True}$ iff $v(P) = \text{True}$ and $v(Q) = \text{True}$
- $v(P \vee Q) = \text{True}$ iff $v(P) = \text{True}$ or $v(Q) = \text{True}$
- $v(\perp) = \text{False}$ (since $\perp \stackrel{\text{df}}{=} P \wedge \neg P$)
- $v(\top) = \text{True}$ (since $\top \stackrel{\text{df}}{=} \neg \perp$)

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Truth Tables

- To **compute** (in polynomial time) truth valuations, the method of Truth Tables was introduced (Wittgenstein, 1921).
- Truth tables are well-know:

P	Q	$\neg P$	$P \wedge Q$	$P \vee Q$	Truth-table (TT) for the logical constants \neg, \wedge, \vee
False	False	True	False	False	
False	True	True	False	True	
True	False	False	False	True	
True	True	False	True	True	

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Truth Relation (Satisfaction Relation)

- Let v be a truth valuation on language L .
- We define the **truth-relation** (or satisfaction-relation) $|=$ and write $v \models P$ (read: v **satisfies** P) iff $v(P) = \text{True}$.
- Given a set of propositions Γ , we define $v \models \Gamma$ iff if $v \models \theta$ for all $\theta \in \Gamma$.

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Model, Satisfiable

- Definition. Let v be a truth valuation on language L .
- v is a **model of** a proposition P (set of propositions Γ) iff v satisfies P (Γ).
- P (Γ) is **satisfiable** if there is some truth valuation v such that $v \models P$ ($v \models \Gamma$).

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Truth and Validity

- Definition. Let v be a truth valuation:
 - (1) P is **true under** v if $v \models P$.
 - (2) P is **valid** (and P is called a **tautology**), if $v \models P$ for all v (notation: $\models P$).
- Note that the notions of 'true' and 'false' are relative to some truth valuation (cf. 'under').
- **Fact:** A proposition is true iff is satisfiable.

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Truth Relation and Reasoning Services

- The basic **reasoning tasks** (or "services") we can represent (and compute) using $|=$ are:
- **Model Checking (EVAL):** Is a proposition P true under a truth-valuation v (i.e., is v a model of P : $v \models P$)?
- **Example:** $P = \text{'inLab-monkey} \vee \text{inLab-box'}$
 P is true under any truth-valuation v that assigns True to $\neg \text{LabEmpty}$.

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Truth Relation and Reasoning Services

- **Validity:** Is a proposition P true under every possible truth-valuation v?
- **Example:** P = 'Being \vee \neg Being'.

P is valid, since for every truth-valuation v, either
 $v(\text{'Being'}) = \text{T}$, so $v(\text{P}) = \text{T}$;
 or
 $v(\text{'Being'}) = \text{F}$, so $v(\neg\text{'Being'}) = \text{T}$, i.e. $v(\text{P}) = \text{T}$.

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Truth Relation and Reasoning Services

- **Satisfiability (SAT):** Is P satisfiable?
- **Example:** 1. 'Being \vee \neg Being' is satisfiable.

2. P = 'A \wedge \neg A' is unsatisfiable (inconsistent):

for every truth-valuation v,
 either
 $v(\text{A}) = \text{T}$, so $v(\neg\text{A}) = \text{F}$, hence $v(\text{P}) = \text{F}$;
 or
 $v(\text{A}) = \text{F}$, so $v(\neg\text{A}) = \text{T}$, hence $v(\text{P}) = \text{F}$.

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Propositional Entailment

- **Definition.** A set Γ (eventually empty) of propositions **entails** a proposition Ψ (written: $\Gamma \models \Psi$) if for all v,
 if $v \models \theta$ for all $\theta \in \Gamma$, then $v \models \Psi$.
- If $\Gamma \models \Psi$, then we say that Ψ is a **logical consequence** of Γ , and Γ **logically implies** Ψ .
- **Remark:** The entailment is a relationship between wff's that is based on semantics

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Examples

- Suppose P = 'today' \vee 'tomorrow'. Then:
 - $\{\}$ \models P (notation: \models P)
 - {'today'} \models 'today' \vee 'tomorrow'
 - {'today'} not- \models 'tomorrow'
- **Exercise:**
 - Define Γ and P such that $\Gamma \models$ P.
 - Define Γ and P such that Γ not- \models P.

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Reductio ad Absurdum

- In the finite, we can formally relate the propositional entailment to satisfiability.
- **Theorem:** $\{\theta_1, \dots, \theta_n\} \models \Psi$ if and only if $\{\theta_1, \theta_2, \dots, \theta_n, \neg\Psi\}$ is unsatisfiable.
 - **Proof:** exercise.
- The theorem fixes the way to prove Ψ by *reductio ad absurdum*.

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Implication Premise

- Propositional entailment **in the finite**, i.e.:

$\{\theta_1, \dots, \theta_n\} \models \Psi$
 ($\{\theta_1, \dots, \theta_n\}$ finite set of propositions) can be viewed as the **logical implication**

$(\theta_1 \wedge \theta_2 \wedge \dots \wedge \theta_n) \rightarrow \Psi$
 [$(\theta_1 \wedge \theta_2 \wedge \dots \wedge \theta_n)$ **logically implies** Ψ]

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Implication (Syntax)

- We extend our alphabet of symbols with the **defined** logical constants:
 - \rightarrow (implication)
 - \leftrightarrow (double implication or equivalence)

• **Remark:** \perp and \top are **syntactically defined** symbols: $\perp \stackrel{\text{df}}{=} P \wedge \neg P$, $\top \stackrel{\text{df}}{=} \neg \perp$,
 $\rightarrow, \leftrightarrow$ are **semantically defined** symbols!

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Implication (Semantics)

- $P \rightarrow Q, P \leftrightarrow Q$ are wff's for all wff's P, Q .
- Let propositions ψ, θ , and **finite** set $\{\theta_1, \dots, \theta_n\}$ of propositions be given. We define:
 - $\models \theta \rightarrow \psi$ ($\theta \rightarrow \psi$ **valid**) iff $\theta \models \psi$
 - $\models (\theta_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \theta_n) \rightarrow \psi$ iff $\{\theta_1, \dots, \theta_n\} \models \psi$
 - $\models \theta \leftrightarrow \psi$ iff $\theta \rightarrow \psi$ and $\psi \rightarrow \theta$.

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Truth Table of \rightarrow

- By the definition of the semantics of \rightarrow in terms of \models we have the following truth-table for the logical implication $P \rightarrow Q$:

P	Q	$P \models Q$	$P \rightarrow Q$
False	False	True	True
False	True	True	True
True	False	False	False
True	True	True	True

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Logical Implication Three Properties

- P1:** For all ψ, θ ,
 $\psi \rightarrow \theta$ iff $\neg \psi \vee \theta$.
- P2:** For all ψ ,
 $\neg \psi$ iff $\psi \rightarrow \perp$.
- P3:** For all ψ ,
 $\perp \models \psi$
 (inconsistent theories imply any proposition)

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Examples

- Laws for \wedge, \neg and \rightarrow :
 - $\neg (A \wedge \neg B) \rightarrow \neg (A \rightarrow B)$
 - $\neg (A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow (A \wedge \neg B)$
- Pierce's law: $((A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow A) \rightarrow A$
- De Morgan's laws:
 - $\neg (A \vee B) \rightarrow (\neg A \wedge \neg B); (\neg A \wedge \neg B) \rightarrow \neg (A \vee B)$
 - $\neg (A \wedge B) \rightarrow (\neg A \vee \neg B); (\neg A \vee \neg B) \rightarrow \neg (A \wedge B)$

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Exercise

- Prove the following double implications (i.e., **logical equivalences**) by using truth tables.
 - $(\alpha \wedge \beta) \leftrightarrow (\beta \wedge \alpha)$ **commutativity of \wedge**
 - $(\alpha \vee \beta) \leftrightarrow (\beta \vee \alpha)$ **commutativity of \vee**
 - $((\alpha \wedge \beta) \wedge \gamma) \leftrightarrow (\alpha \wedge (\beta \wedge \gamma))$
associativity of \wedge

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Exercise (cont')

- $((\alpha \vee \beta) \vee \gamma) \leftrightarrow (\alpha \vee (\beta \vee \gamma))$
associativity of \vee
- $\neg(\neg\alpha) \leftrightarrow \alpha$ double-negation elimination
- $(\alpha \rightarrow \beta) \leftrightarrow (\neg\beta \rightarrow \neg\alpha)$ contraposition
- $(\alpha \rightarrow \beta) \leftrightarrow (\neg\alpha \vee \beta)$ \rightarrow -elimination
- $(\alpha \leftrightarrow \beta) \leftrightarrow ((\alpha \rightarrow \beta) \wedge (\beta \rightarrow \alpha))$ \leftrightarrow -elimination

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Exercise (cont')

- $\neg(\alpha \wedge \beta) \leftrightarrow (\neg\alpha \vee \neg\beta)$ DeMorgan Law for \wedge
- $\neg(\alpha \vee \beta) \leftrightarrow (\neg\alpha \wedge \neg\beta)$ DeMorgan Law for \vee
- $(\alpha \wedge (\beta \vee \gamma)) \leftrightarrow ((\alpha \wedge \beta) \vee (\alpha \wedge \gamma))$
distributivity of \wedge over \vee
- $(\alpha \vee (\beta \wedge \gamma)) \leftrightarrow ((\alpha \vee \beta) \wedge (\alpha \vee \gamma))$
distributivity of \vee over \wedge

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Reasoning

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Reasoning Services

- Basic reasoning tasks for a PL-based system :
 - **Entailment**: Is a proposition ψ true if the world represented by a propositional theory KB is true? I.e.: $KB \models \psi$?
 - **Consistency**: Is ψ consistent in a KB? I.e.: $KB \cup \{\psi\} \models \perp$?
 - **Satisfiability (SAT)**: Is KB satisfiable?

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PSAT-Problem (Boolean SAT)

- Definition.
 $PSAT = \{P \in PL \mid \text{exists } \nu \text{ such that } \nu \models P\}$.
- **Satisfiability Problem**: Is PSAT decidable?
- Theorem [Cook, 1971] PSAT is NP-complete

The theorem established a "limitative result" of PL (and Logic). A problem is NP-complete when it is **very difficult** to be computed!

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PSAT (Two Remarks)

- Remark 1: Cook's Theorem known as Cook-Levin's Theorem, since L. Levin proved an equivalent theorem two years later (1973).
- Remark 2: PSAT (i.e. SAT in PL) and Cook-Levin's Theorem motivated an active area of research on **heuristic algorithms** for PSAT.
- PSAT: a fundamental problem in applications
See for instance: <http://www.satisfiability.org>

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Davis-Putnam's Procedure

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Premise

- The Davis–Putnam algorithm was developed by Martin Davis and Hilary Putnam in 1960 for checking the **validity** of a **FOL-formula**.
- The Davis–Putnam algorithm is not a decision procedure in the strict sense, as it does *not* terminate on some inputs.
- We are interested in the PL part of the DP algorithm well-known as DPLL procedure.

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DPLL Procedure Introduction

- The DPLL algorithm is a decision procedure developed by M. Davis, H. Putnam, G. Logemann, and D. Loveland in 1962 for deciding the **satisfiability** of a **proposition** in conjunctive normal form (CNF).
- DPLL is a highly efficient procedure for a NP-complete and important SAT problem.
- We present the main elements of DPLL.

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Background Concepts

- To understand the DPLL procedure we first require to know some background concepts:
 - literal (negative / positive)
 - clause (unit / empty)
 - conjunctive normal form (CNF)
 - the conversion procedure to rewrite a proposition to its equivalent CNF.

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Literals

- A **literal** is either an atomic proposition or the negation of an atomic proposition, i.e., for all propositional variables P,
P and $\neg P$ are literals.
- P is a **positive literal**, $\neg P$ is a **negative literal**
- **Examples:** 'inLab-monkey', 'airplane', ' \neg highBox=1 mt', ' \neg inLab-monkey', ...

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Clauses

- A **clause** is the disjunction of literals.
 - **Example:** $B \vee \neg C \vee \neg D$, $\text{Being} \vee \neg \text{Being}$, ...
- A **unit clause** is a clause that contains only a single literal.
 - **Example:** B, $\neg C$ are unit clauses, $B \vee \neg C$ isn't
- A **empty clause** is a clause with all variables assigned so that all the literals in it are false.

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Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF)

- A proposition is in **conjunctive normal form** (CNF) if it is a (finite) conjunction of clauses.
- **Examples:** $(A \vee \neg B) \wedge (B \vee \neg C \vee \neg D)$,
 $\neg A \wedge B$, $A \wedge (B \vee C \vee \neg D)$, ...
- **Counter-examples:**
 $\neg(A \wedge B)$: \neg is the outmost operator
 $A \wedge (B \vee C \wedge \neg D)$: \wedge is nested within \vee

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Conversion to CNF

- **Theorem.** Every proposition P has a CNF, i.e., P can be converted (in polynomial time) into a proposition Q such that:
 - Q is in CNF
 - P and Q are equivalent (i.e., have the same truth table).
- **Proof:** See e.g. (Mendelson, 1987) [Prop. 1.4, Ex. 1.41 (a)].

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Conversion to CNF (Remark)

- A conversion to a CNF that operates as in the theorem above is said to be **complete**.
- The algorithm implementing the conversion to a CNF is based on the tautologies about logical equivalence (or double implication):
 - double-negation law (i.e. elimination of $\neg\neg$)
 - De Morgan's laws
 - distributive laws
 - elimination of \rightarrow and \leftrightarrow (see the next slide)

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Conversion to CNF Basic Tautologies

- $\neg(\neg\alpha) \leftrightarrow \alpha$ double-negation elimination
- $\neg(\alpha \wedge \beta) \leftrightarrow (\neg\alpha \vee \neg\beta)$ De Morgan's Law for \wedge
- $\neg(\alpha \vee \beta) \leftrightarrow (\neg\alpha \wedge \neg\beta)$ De Morgan's Law for \vee
- $(\alpha \wedge (\beta \vee \gamma)) \leftrightarrow ((\alpha \wedge \beta) \vee (\alpha \wedge \gamma))$ distributivity of \wedge over \vee
- $(\alpha \vee (\beta \wedge \gamma)) \leftrightarrow ((\alpha \vee \beta) \wedge (\alpha \vee \gamma))$ distributivity of \vee over \wedge
- $(\alpha \rightarrow \beta) \leftrightarrow (\neg\alpha \vee \beta)$ \rightarrow -elimination
- $(\alpha \leftrightarrow \beta) \leftrightarrow ((\alpha \rightarrow \beta) \wedge (\beta \rightarrow \alpha))$ \leftrightarrow -elimination

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Example

Conversion to CNF of ' $A \leftrightarrow (B \vee C)$ '

1. Eliminate \leftrightarrow : $(A \rightarrow (B \vee C)) \wedge ((B \vee C) \rightarrow A)$
 2. Eliminate \rightarrow : $(\neg A \vee B \vee C) \wedge (\neg(B \vee C) \vee A)$
 3. Move \neg inwards using de Morgan's laws:
 $(\neg A \vee B \vee C) \wedge ((\neg B \wedge \neg C) \vee A)$
 4. Apply distributivity of \vee over \wedge and flatten:
 $(\neg A \vee B \vee C) \wedge (\neg B \vee A) \wedge (\neg C \vee A)$ (*)
- (*) in CNF and equivalent to ' $A \leftrightarrow (B \vee C)$ '.

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Disjunctive Normal Form (DNF)

- Although not necessary to the DPLL procedure, we mention also the DNFs.
- Premise: A **conjunctive clause** is a (finite) conjunction of literals. NB: it is not a clause!
- A proposition is in **disjunctive normal form** (DNF) if it is a (finite) disjunction of conjunctive clauses.
- **Examples:** $\neg A \vee B$, $A \vee (B \wedge C \wedge \neg D)$, ...

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CNFSAT-Problem

- **Definition.**
 $CNFSAT = \{P \text{ in CNF} \mid \text{exists } \forall \text{ s.t. } \forall \models P\}$.
 - Informally, CNFSAT is a set of propositions P in CNF such that there is some truth-valuation (also called truth- or propositional assignment) of the truth-values to the propositional variables in P that will make P true.
- **CNFSAT-Problem:** Is CNFSAT decidable?
- Like PSAT, CNFSAT is NP-complete.

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DPLL Procedure

- DPLL employs a backtracking search to explore the space of propositional variables truth-valuations of an proposition P in CNF, looking for a satisfying truth-valuation of P.
- DPLL solves the CNFSAT-Problem by searching a truth-assignment that satisfies all clauses in the input proposition.

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DPLL Procedure Main Steps

- The DPLL procedure does the following:
 1. chooses a literal in the input proposition P
 2. assigns a truth-value (*) to its variable as to satisfy it
 3. simplifies P by removing all clauses in P which become true under the truth-assignment in step 2. and all literals in P that become false from the remaining clauses
 4. recursively checks if the simplified proposition obtained in step 3. is satisfiable; if this is the case, then P is satisfiable. Otherwise, the same recursive checking is done assuming the opposite truth value (*).

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DPLL Procedure

- **Input:** a proposition P in CNF.
- **Output:** "P satisfiable" or "P unsatisfiable".

Step 1 : Unit Propagation

While there is no empty clause and an unit clause exists, select an unit clause and assign a variable in it to satisfy it.

Step 2 : Satisfiability Checking

If all clauses are satisfied, return "satisfiable".

Steps 3 and 4 : see the next slide.

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DPLL Procedure (cont')

Step 3 : Unsatisfiability Checking

If an empty clause exists, return "unsatisfiable".

Step 4 : Splitting Rule

- Select a variable whose value is not assigned.
- Assign True to the variable and call DPLL. If the result is "satisfiable" then return "satisfiable".
- Otherwise, assign False to the variable and call DPLL again. Return the result of it.

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DPLL Procedure Example 1

- Take $P = A \wedge (A \vee \neg A) \wedge B$
- The DPLL procedure does the following:
 1. chooses a literal in P, e.g., A
 2. assigns a truth-value to A, e.g., $v(A) = T$
 - 3.1 simplifies P by removing all clauses in P which become true under $v(A) = T$ in step 2: **remove A** and $(A \vee \neg A)$
 [in fact: by assuming $v(A) = T$ we have $v(A \vee \neg A) = T$]
 - 3.2 simplifies P by removing all literals in P that become false from the remaining clauses: **nothing to remove**
 [in fact: B is the only remaining clause, and $v(B) = ?$]

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DPLL Procedure Example 1 (cont')

- 4. recursively checks if the simplified proposition obtained in step 3. is satisfiable:
 - simplified proposition from step 3: B
 - is B satisfiable? Yes: just define $v(B) = T$, hence $v \models B$.
- 4.1 if this is the case, the original formula is satisfiable:
 - Yes, this is the case:
 - a model for it is v s.t. $v(A) = T$ and $v(B) = T$;
- 4.2 otherwise, the same recursive check is done assuming the opposite truth value:
 - No, not the case, DPLL did terminate in 4.1.

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DPLL Procedure Example 2

- Take $P = C \wedge (A \vee \neg A) \wedge B$
- The DPLL procedure does the following:
 1. chooses a literal in P, e.g., C
 2. assigns a truth-value to C, e.g., $v(C) = T$
 - 3.1 simplifies P by removing all clauses in P which become true under $v(C) = T$ in step 2: remove C
 - 3.2 simplifies P by removing all literals in P that become false from the remaining clauses: nothing to remove [the remaining clauses were not assigned a truth-value]

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DPLL Procedure Example 2 (cont')

- 4. recursively checks if the simplified proposition obtained in step 3. is satisfiable:
 - simplified proposition from step 3: $(A \vee \neg A) \wedge B$
 - is $(A \vee \neg A) \wedge B$ satisfiable?
- Call DPLL from step 1:
 1. choose a literal in $(A \vee \neg A) \wedge B$, e.g., A
 2. assign a truth-value to A, e.g., $v(A) = T$
 - 3.1 simplify by removing all clauses in $(A \vee \neg A) \wedge B$ which become true under $v(A) = T$: remove $(A \vee \neg A)$

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DPLL Procedure Example 2 (cont')

- 3.2 simplify by removing all literals in $(A \vee \neg A) \wedge B$ that become false from the remaining clauses: nothing to remove
- 4. recursively checks if the simplified proposition obtained in step 3. is satisfiable:
 - simplified proposition from step 3: B
 - is B satisfiable? Yes: just define $v(B) = T$, hence $v \models B$
- 4.1 if this is the case, the original formula is satisfiable:
 - Yes, this is the case:
 - a model for it is v s.t. $v(A) = T$ and $v(B) = T$
- DPLL terminate with output: " $C \wedge (A \vee \neg A) \wedge B$ satisfiable"

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Horn Form Clauses and Formulas

- A **Horn clause** is a clause of which *at most one* is positive.
 - **Example:** $\neg A \vee B \vee \neg C \vee D$.
 - It is **definite** if *exactly one* literal is positive.
 - **Example:** $\neg A \vee \neg B \vee \neg C \vee D$.
- P is in **horn form** (P **Horn formula**) if P is in CNF and all its clauses are all Horn clauses.

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Horn Form Clauses and Formulas

- Theorem.** Every Horn clause can be written as conjunction of an implication whose premise is a conjunction of positive literals and whose conclusion is a single positive literal.
- Proof:** Exercise.
- Example.** $\neg A \vee B \vee \neg C \vee D$ can be rewritten as $(A \wedge \neg B \wedge C) \rightarrow D$

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HORNSAT-Problem

- **Definition.**
HORNSAT = {P Horn | exists v s.t. $v \models P$ }.
- Informally, HORNSAT is a set of propositions P in Horn form such that there is some truth-valuation (also called truth- or propositional assignment) of the truth-values to the propositional variables in P that will make P true.
- **HSAT-Problem:** Is HORNSAT decidable?
- Unlike PSAT and CNFSAT (NP-complete), H-SAT is solvable in polynomial time.

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Summary

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Pros and Cons - Pros

- PL is declarative: syntax captures **facts**.
- PL allows partial/disjunctive/negated knowledge (unlike most databases).
- PL is **compositional**: $\models A \wedge B$ from $\models A$ and $\models B$.
- Meaning in PL is **context-independent** (unlike natural language).
- PSAT fundamental in important applications.

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Pros and Cons - Cons

- PL has **very limited expressive power!** (yet useful in applications, we'll in a few slides)
- **Example 1:** In PL you cannot say "pits cause breezes in adjacent squares" except by writing one sentence for each square.
- **Example 2 (De Morgan, 1864):** inferences like "*All horses are animals; therefore, the head of a horse is the head of an animal*" cannot be handled in PL. Why?

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
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Example (KB)

In PL we **can suppose** we **know** that:

1. AreaManager \rightarrow Manager
2. TopManager \rightarrow Manager
3. Manager \rightarrow Employee
4. TopManager(John)



Observe: 1,2,3, 4 are propositions.

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Example (cont')

But we **can't deduce** the following:

1. AreaManager \rightarrow Manager
5. Manager(John)
2. TopManager \rightarrow Manager
6. Employee(John)
3. Manager \rightarrow Employee
4. TopManager(John)

• Why?

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Example (cont')

But we **can't deduce** the following:


- 5. Manager(John) 1. AreaManager → Manager
- 6. Employee(John) 2. TopManager → Manager
- Why? 3. Manager → Employee
- Because of 4. TopManager(John)
- can't be used together!
- recall that in 'TopManager(John)', in PL 'John' is not separable from 'TopManager'.



Example (cont')

In PL we **can't suppose** we **know** that:

- 1. AreaManager(x) → Manager(x)
- 2. TopManager(x) → Manager(x)
- 3. Manager(x) → Employee(x)
- 4. TopManager(John)



NB: 1,2,3 are not propositions, because of **variables!**



Pros and Cons - Cons

- The semantics of PL - as it is based on truth valuation (i.e. True, False) does *not* help the **concept modeler**.
- Example 2: Meaning of **IS-A relation**:

 - Manager ⊆ Employee
 - **Question:** Is 'Manager → Employee' a **proposition** that **models** the schema?



Summary

- PL has not much to offer to the modeler apart from **background notions** and PSAT algorithms crucial in many application areas.
- Philosophically interesting question: ClassicalPL (i.e., CLP, where $\models AV \neg A$) or PL?
- **Pros:**
 - 1. PL is declarative: syntax captures facts
 - 2. Context-independent semantics